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classification54 , with different German and Scandinavian law jurisdictions55 (Table 14). The legal 
effect still holds.  
Finally, the choice of policymakers to establish the concentration of supervisory powers could 
be facilitated by an institutional environment characterized by good governance. The relationship 
between good governance and the supervision concentration process could be explained, if we 
suppose that a policymaker who cares about soundness and efficiency would prefer the single 
financial authority as the optimal one in the face of the blurring challenges.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The objective of this paper was to analyse the role of central bank institutional position in 
influencing the recent tendency to unify the powers of financial supervision, highlighting the 
robustness of the central bank fragmentation effect.  
The results seem particularly interesting for future research developments. It will be 
important to go in depth in the analysis of the determinants of the central bank fragmentation 
effect. In this paper the central bank fragmentation effect is an independent variable in explaining 
the supervision unification level.  
The next step forward will be to consider the degree of central bank involvement as a 
dependent variable, in order to identify consistent proxies of the potential different causes (blurring 
                                                 
54Pistor (2000) instead of La Porta et al. (1998). 
55In La Porta et al (1999) the German and Scandinavian jurisdictions are: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, 
Japan, Korea, Norway, and Sweden. For historical reasons Pistor (2000) also includes: Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic. 
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hazard effect, bureaucracy effect, reputation endowment effect) that could explain the decision of 
the policymaker to maintain or reform the supervision responsibility of the monetary authority56.  
Finally, from the theoretical point of view, the future effort will be to model the policymaker 
decision framework, in order to better highlight the features of the institutional and political 
process that leads a supervisory regime to assume given characteristics. Using the principal agent 
approach for addressing the architecture of financial supervision seems a very promising avenue. 
                                                 
56Completely and satisfactorily identifying what the consistent proxies could be is not a simple problem: first because 
the policymaker preferences or beliefs on the pros and cons of reforming the central bank involvement in 
supervision are not easily captured in concrete indicators. Examples are the political perceptions of the blurring 
hazard risks, the central bank reputation endowment or the bureaucratic power. The point is that generally these 
kinds of variables are not available for a large cross countries sample. To do an example, the author looking for 
proxies for the central bank power, in order to capture the bureaucracy effect and/or the reputation endowment 
effect. Regarding the central bank power, a central bank independence index (Cukierman Index, sample = 56 
countries) has been proved as proxy, but the variable was not significant. Furthermore the author proved also as a 
power proxy the central bank age (sample= 89 countries) but the variable was not significant. Finally the power of 
central banks could be measured in number of employees, relative to overall financial authorities’ employees 
(sample= 42 countries), or to the financial industry size (sample= 44 countries), but again the variable was not 
significant. The tables are available on request. 
